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Defending A Person Charged With Genocide, by
Anthony D'Amato,* 1 Chicago Journal of International Law 459-469 (Fall, 2000)
Abstract: I was asked to represent Dr. Milan Kovacevic who had been indicted by the International
Criminal Tribunal for Yugoslavia ("ICTY") for complicity in genocide. Had he lived through it, his trial
would have been the first by the ICTY for the crime of genocide. I would like to describe some of the
tribulations of defending clients accused of grave humanitarian offenses in the ICTY.
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[pg459]** In August 1997, I was asked to represent Dr. Milan Kovacevic, a
Bosnian Serb anesthesiologist who had been indicted by the International Criminal
Tribunal for Yugoslavia ("ICTY") for complicity in genocide. Had he lived through it,
his trial would have been the first by the ICTY for the crime of genocide. I would like to
describe some of the tribulations of defending clients accused of grave humanitarian
offenses in the ICTY. Perhaps by relating stories of my experiences there, some insights
for reform can be drawn. First, I will begin with the background of the case itself.
I. THE HISTORY AND BACKGROUND OF THE CASE AGAINST DR. KOVACEVIC
Dusan Vucicevic, a schoolmate and fellow anesthesiologist of Kovacevic's, asked
me to take his friend's case. The opportunity seemed fascinating, but the idea of
defending a genocidal maniac (as I then conceived of it) was quite foreign to my worldview. There were many publicity-seeking attorneys who were anxious to defend a person
accused of genocide, so he certainly could have gotten another lawyer if I turned him
down. I felt free to accept or reject the case depending on what I could find out about Dr.
Kovacevic and the context in which he operated.
Dr. Kovacevic was the chief anesthesiologist and chief administrator of the
Prijedor City Hospital in Prijedor, Bosnia (formally known as Republica Srbska). Dr.
Kovacevic also served as deputy mayor of that town, and it was in his official position
that he was indicted by the ICTY for genocide. He was at work in the hospital on the
morning of July 10, 1997, when some unknown individuals arrived, claiming to have a
[pg460] Red Cross package to deliver to him downstairs. He went downstairs to receive
the package, but it turned out to be a set-up: North Atlantic Treaty Organization
("NATO") detectives were waiting for him. They arrested him and stuck him on a
helicopter along with the local police chief's son. The son had been arrested by NATO
after Simo Drljaca, his father (who was the indicted person) was shot to death while
resisting NATO arrest. The detectives took the doctor and the young man to Tuzla and
put them into a metal container, the kind used for transatlantic shipping. With the
scorching July sun beating down on this metal container, the container's heaters were
turned on, and the two men were pushed against the wall. It was so hot in the container
that the NATO soldiers could not bear to remain in it for more than a few minutes at a
time. While the two prisoners were standing against the wall, Dr. Kovacevic's indictment
of complicity in genocide was read to them—there was no indictment against the police
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chief's son—by NATO personnel entering and leaving the trailer. As the indictment was
slowly read, soldiers came in and out, pressing their guns against the back of the
prisoners' heads and clicking the triggers. Each time the prisoners thought they would be
killed. The procedure went on for a couple of hours.FN1 Then the two prisoners were
taken out of the sealed container and transported by helicopter to the detention center in
The Hague, where soon after his arrival, Dr. Kovacevic suffered his first heart attack.FN2
I have reason to believe that when he died of an aneurysm some eleven months later (two
weeks into his trial), his death may have been caused in part by the torture he endured at
the hands of the NATO police.
I did not immediately accept the offer to defend Dr. Kovacevic at the time I was
approached to do so in Chicago. Instead I left the question open, pending my first trip to
The Hague. Before undertaking the trip, I studied the situation of a deputy mayor in a
Yugoslavian city in order to obtain background about my client. I compared what I
studied to the lengthy indictment issued against him.
The recent history of Yugoslavia revealed that as a result of the long years of rule
under the progressive communist Marshall Tito, three distinct chains of command have
been established throughout the state: the police, the military, and the civilian. These
three "branches" of government were not just distinct, they were entirely separated.
Police matters belonged to the police, army matters to the army, and whatever belonged
to neither was the provenance of civilian authority. This divided structure was so rigidly
enforced that I could not imagine how a civilian official such as Dr. Kovacevic, a deputy
mayor, would have any authority over detention camps set up by the army or the police.
In fact, if a civilian official tried to exert any authority [pg461] over the camps, he would
probably have found himself joining the camp's population. In short, no one crossed
governmental power lines. Of course, this system was found to be quite useful in
avoiding responsibility. As I discovered by reading news articles and books by
investigative reporters on the Yugoslav civil wars, when reporters tried to inspect the
various detention camps spread throughout Yugoslavia, the army officials guarding the
camps claimed to lack authority to let the reporters in. The reporters knew that this was
not true. They suspected the army officials to have been ordered to deny any authority
over the camps so as to protect all army personnel against future indictments if war
crimes occurred in the camps.
I must add that such future indictments were not expected to come entirely from
international tribunals. Violations of the laws of war were also crimes under Yugoslavian
law. Yugoslavian leaders such as Slobodan Milosevic, Radtko Mladic, and Radovan
Karadzic—perhaps on the advice of their attorneys—sent out many directives to the army
and police not to engage in any kind of criminal activity prohibited by The Hague and
Geneva Conventions, and if they did so they would be court-martialed and prosecuted for
those crimes by Yugoslavian authorities. Thus it became standard operating procedure for
army and police officials to deny any knowledge of torture, rape, brutality, and especially
genocide. And as I have said, they denied any authority for setting up the detention
camps where torture and rape allegedly occurred, and instead claimed that authority and
control over the camps was in the hands of the civilian authorities.
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If the official documents contained blanket prohibitions on criminal activities, I
wondered how the "real" orders were conveyed to the army and the police. I discovered,
by reading histories of the brave Serbian resistance movement during World War II, that
the Chetniks (the original "freedom fighters") were able to frustrate the Nazi occupiers by
never wearing any military insignia or identification of any sort, by never accepting
written orders from anyone, and only by obeying comrades in the resistance movement
who were personally known to them. The Yugoslav resistance against the German Army
was tremendously effective, thus testifying to the efficacy of a system of oral orders sent
down through a rigid chain of command. This tradition of non-identification, facial
recognition, and verbal orders of course carried through the army and police after the Tito
regime ended, and has made it especially difficult for the prosecutors at the ICTY to
obtain evidence of "command authority" to prosecute Yugoslavian leaders for war crimes
committed by the regular army, the paramilitary army, and the police.
With this general background in mind, I tentatively signed up to represent Dr.
Kovacevic subject to the possibility of withdrawing after I had checked the case out at
The Hague. Once in The Hague, I watched the process of selecting defense counsel.
Belgrade, the capital of Serbia, provides lawyers free of charge to Serbians on trial at The
Hague. Dr. Kovacevic had been provided one of these attorneys before I was contacted,
and after he accepted me he dismissed his Serbian counsel. Dr. Kovacavic did not trust
the Belgrade lawyer and he told me that he was not sure that the lawyer [pg462] was
entirely on his side. As I discovered, it is possible, in high profile political cases, that the
home country is more interested in protecting officials at home who have not been
indicted than in protecting an arrested person like Dr. Kovacevic. Indeed, at my first
meeting with the prosecutor, I was told that what the Office of the Prosecution most
wanted from Dr. Kovacevic was his testimony as a witness against other high officials in
Serbia. For this cooperation, the prosecutor was willing to plea-bargain. It was certainly
clear to me, at that meeting, that if I could get a good deal for my client, I might reach a
tentative agreement with the prosecutor subject to my client's approval. I would not
protect any at-large war criminals in Serbia. In fact, my sympathies were entirely on the
side of the job the tribunal was doing, and I regarded myself as an officer of the court
whose responsibility it was to help the tribunal be fair and render justice by virtue of the
adversarial process. In contrast, the many Yugoslavian lawyers representing defendants at
the ICTY contemptuously referred to it as a kangaroo court. Before seeing Dr. Kovacevic
in the detention center, I had a preliminary meeting with the prosecutor assigned to the
Kovacevic case. Mr. Michael Keegan had been in the office of the Judge Advocate
General and served as a prosecutor in the US military in numerous court-martials. A
relatively young and no-nonsense kind of person, Mr. Keegan met me in the hallway of
the tribunal building. I suggested that we go to his office on the top floor of the building,
but he said that the entire prosecutor's offices were off-bounds to defense counsel.
Having seen the cramped little room in which I was supposed to do my work, I asked him
rhetorically if the reason for that rule was to keep defense counsel from drawing
comparisons.
But what I was really thinking about in my meeting with Mr. Keegan were two
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questions: first, what hard evidence did he have against Dr. Kovacevic, and second, if he
did have hard evidence, was there room for reasonable plea bargaining? In my own mind
I had no intention of going to trial if there was evidence beyond a reasonable doubt that
Dr. Kovacevic was complicitous in the commission of genocide. In that case, I would
have met with him in the detention center and told him frankly that I would use my best
efforts to get him the best possible deal with the prosecutor, but that I would not be
effective as his trial attorney. He would be better off finding an attorney who had no
psychological difficulty in the possibility of freeing a genocidal killer. On the other hand,
I thought, if Mr. Keegan had no hard evidence to tell me about and my best judgment
indicated that Dr. Kovacevic was not in fact complicit in the commission of genocide,
then I could defend him zealously.
There was no doubt that Dr. Kovacevic had foolishly shot his mouth off during
the crisis. Like many people interviewed by a TV crew, he launched into his personal
ideology and "wisdom" about the situation in Yugoslavia. Mr. Keegan showed me the
transcripts of Dr. Kovacevic's television interviews (which were widely broadcast at the
time), and I later had occasion to view the tapes. The deputy mayor of Prijedor had no
reservation in telling the television cameras that the Serbs and the Muslims in Prijedor
could no longer live peacefully together, and that if the Muslims were wise they would
move out of town. He said that there were many other cities where the [pg463] majority
Muslim population had expelled the Serbs. Resettlement and home-swapping is
inevitable, Dr. Kovacevic said, because he foresaw violence erupting in the increasingly
volatile town of Prijedor.
Now perhaps a deputy mayor should have been more politically correct, more
inclusive, more pluralistic. But from what I could determine, he had committed no crime
in stating his personal opinions, no matter how forcefully and no matter how strongly he
held them. And indeed, in the bloody aftermath, it would seem that any Muslim citizens
of Prijedor who had taken Dr. Kovacevic's advice and moved out of town might today
owe their lives to him. The Dayton Accords, promising a unified, pluralistic Bosnia, have
never even gotten off the ground, and a great deal of blood has been shed since the
Accords were signed in 1994.
I also knew, from reading documents prior to my meeting with Mr. Keegan, that
Dr. Kovacevic seemed to have no personal prejudice against Muslims or Croats. As
director of the city hospital, he had insisted on the retention of Muslim doctors at a time
when other civilian authorities were clamoring for their removal. After the civil war
started to reach Prijedor, he insisted that the hospital take in and care for Muslims who
had been shot or otherwise wounded by the Serbian army and paramilitary forces, even
though enormous pressure was put upon him to bar the hospital doors to such persons.
The population of Prijedor at the time was evenly divided between Serbs and Muslims,
and Dr. Kovacevic had the respect of both groups.
I asked Mr. Keegan whether he had any evidence in his possession that Dr.
Kovacevic had ordered any acts of genocide? No. I asked whether the prosecutor had any
evidence that Dr. Kovacevic had ever participated in any acts of genocide? No. Was there
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any evidence that he had ever seen or otherwise witnessed the commission of any acts of
genocide? No. Was there any evidence that Dr. Kovacevic was connected in any way to
the commission of acts of genocide? No. Was there any evidence that Dr. Kovacevic was
in the chain of command that could have orally ordered the commission of any acts of
genocide? He signed some orders that arguably facilitated the commission of genocide.
As deputy mayor of Prijedor, which was home to a major Serbian detention camp, Dr.
Kovacevic would have had substantial local knowledge and some connection to the camp
by virtue of his municipal duties such as making sure that transportation to the camp was
available and that electric lights in the city were on. These were the kinds of municipal
orders that Dr. Kovacevic had signed, and a great deal would be made of them at trial.
What I heard was enough to convince me that I could defend Dr. Kovacevic in
good faith. I did not know what the factual evidence might eventually show, but he was
entitled to have those facts tested for accuracy, sufficiency, and relevance at trial. He was
entitled to the vigorous cross-examination of witnesses against him.
After a brief meeting and consultation (the Registrar provided a translator) with
my client at the detention center, I met again with Prosecutor Keegan. We discussed a
plea bargain. In return for Dr. Kovacevic's plea of guilt of genocide, his total [pg464]
cooperation regarding the identification of other perpetrators, and his willingness to
appear as a witness against them if they are apprehended, Keegan said that the Office of
the Prosecutor would ask the tribunal to impose a lighter sentence. "No deal," I replied. I
would not have my client admit that he was guilty of the worst crime in the world—
genocide— if in fact he was innocent. I would have considered, however, a plea bargain
to a lesser crime. It was Mr. Keegan's turn to say "No way." Dr. Kovacevic was the
biggest "fish" caught so far and this was the first trial for genocide at the ICTY. I could
see that there were political issues here. In its first genocide trial, the ICTY was not about
to explain to the world that it was wrong in indicting Dr. Kovacevic for genocide. Would
reporters then ask the tribunal the embarrassing question whether Simo Drljaca, who was
accused along with Dr. Kovacevic of genocide, was also not guilty? If so, did not the
British NATO soldiers overreact by shooting him in the back when he was resisting
arrest?
However, an idea occurred to me that Mr. Keegan said he had never heard before.
I suggested that if the prosecution would put a cap of five years on my client's sentence in
the event that he was found guilty of complicity in genocide, I would then arrange for my
client to provide the prosecution with all the names and information that he had, along
with a promise to be a witness against these named suspects. But if Dr. Kovacevic were
acquitted, then he would have no obligation to cooperate with the prosecution. Mr.
Keegan did not like this proposal—I did not think he would.
At the end of our meeting it was quite clear that the prosecutor would be going
all-out to convict Dr. Kovacevic. It was going to be a rigorous and difficult trial. When
the trial was only into its third week, as I have previously mentioned, Dr. Kovacevic died.
But there had already been voluminous pretrial proceedings, oral arguments in open and
closed sessions, examination of documents, and viewing of videotapes.
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II. OBSERVATIONS ON THE OPERATIONS OF THE ICTY
In the course of preparing for trial, it became clear to me that my client knew a
great deal about the chain of command in Bosnia and Serbia. His information would be
valuable to the Office of the Prosecutor. It stood to reason that many people in Belgrade
who may have commanded the commission of war crimes, who had not been arrested or
even indicted, would have considerable interest in encouraging a person who is on trial,
through his Belgrade attorneys, not to divulge such information with the prosecutor. To
be sure, some of the lower-level defendants at The Hague—those who served as camp
guards, for example—may not have figured this out. But Dr. Kovacevic was a learned
man, and quite skeptical to boot. He was primarily concerned with the quality of his legal
defense, and not the quality of his lifestyle in the detention center. (Indeed, he often
reassured me that he was comfortable there, and that he was not mistreated.) He decided
to substitute me for the Belgrade attorney who had initially been assigned to him because,
as he put it, he was not sure he would be getting a good defense at the hands of "the boys
from Belgrade."
[pg465] When accused persons accept the legal services of lawyers from back
home, they obtain a large number of benefits that an outside counsel such as myself could
not easily provide. For example, the lawyers at The Hague from Croatia, Bosnia, and
Serbia were all being paid a salary by the ICTY that was far above their hourly rate back
home. For me, however, the same salary was far below my hourly rate in the United
States. Thus I operated with as much efficiency as possible, whereas the Yugoslav
lawyers seemed to have an endless amount of time on their hands for meeting, talking,
and reminiscing with their clients. In turn, the clients at the drab detention center
welcomed the attention and conversation of their lawyers. The Yugoslav lawyers
provided their clients with packs of cigarettes, food from the local restaurants, news from
back home, and messages from the clients' relatives and friends. More importantly, they
were adept at arranging for family members to travel to The Hague to meet with the
accused persons in the detention center. Perhaps their home governments paid for these
visits and expedited the travel arrangements. These were the benefits to the clients of
counsel from back home, but there were probably costs as well. The Yugoslav lawyers
did not seem well prepared for trial; they did not initiate motions on behalf of their clients
(with the exception of many complaints about conditions in the detention centers); and
their briefs did not reflect (in my opinion) much comprehension about the relevant
substantive rules of international humanitarian law. So far, the decisional record at the
ICTY indicates that nearly all accused persons who have achieved any success (either in
acquittals, or getting charges dropped, or obtaining lighter sentences) have been
represented by attorneys from the United Kingdom, the Netherlands, Canada, and the
United States.
I certainly do not claim that every lawyer out of Serbia may have had a conflict of
interest. But international war-crimes prosecutions are quite different from domestic-law
criminal cases regarding the assignment of counsel. Within a non-totalitarian country, it
is relatively easy to find defense counsel who will use their best efforts for a client; after
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all, their own reputation is at stake. However, in international tribunals such as the ICTY,
lawyers from the home country also may feel a patriotic duty to protect other citizens
back home from international prosecution. Moreover, after the case is over, they
themselves have to go back home. Their own practice and livelihood might be negatively
affected if their client at the ICTY cooperated with the prosecutors and became a witness
against fellow citizens.
Another strange element of choosing defense counsel at The Hague is not familiar
to US lawyers accustomed to common law courts. This is the controlling role of the
Registrar. The Registrar, one might think, ought to be a glorified clerk. However, the
Registrar at The Hague wields a great deal of decision-making power. The Registrar
occupies a huge suite of offices at the ICTY, and has an enormous operation. The rooms
for defense counsel, in comparison, are tiny and under-equipped.
[pg466] Registrars rule with an iron hand, making key decisions that would, in the
United States, be decided by judges or counsel. Prosecutors and judges defer to them.
They are powerful and power-hungry civil servants of the European
bureaucratic/technocratic tradition. I have discovered, through my experience with
another European international court, the European Court of Human Rights, that the
Registrar is even used as an informal conduit for messages to counsel of substantive
matters in their cases. What apparently goes on behind the scenes is that a judge tells a
Registrar official about the judge's impression on a substantive issue in the case, and the
Registrar then conveys that information to counsel as if it is the Registrar's own thinking
independent of the court's.
I do not see anything really wrong with this, even though it is quite contrary to US
litigation practice where clerks' messages to counsel deal only with matters of
compliance with procedural rules. In fact, as I have learned at the European Court of
Human Rights, it can be useful to counsel to obtain informal word from the judges
through this kind of intercession by the Registrar. The judge avoids official commitment
on the issue, and counsel has a chance to revise a brief or a pleading to take care of the
objection "suggested" by the Registrar. Even so, the more the Registrar deals with
substantive matters, the more likely over time the Office of the Registrar will increase in
power and prestige. The aggregation of power in an officially "neutral" Office of the
Registrar inserts an unpredictable third element into the adversary process. It can be
extremely disconcerting. My initial impression of the Registrar upon arrival at The Hague
was that the officials in that office were emotionally supportive of the prosecutors. They
seemed to regard me and other defense counsel as necessary evils.
Over time, I modified this initial assessment. Nevertheless, it still seems to me
that there is a kind of institutional bias at work. The offices of the Registrar, the judges,
and the prosecutors take up most of the space in the building; these people see each other
socially in a relatively small city like The Hague; and they tend to share a sense of pride
and accomplishment when a war criminal is convicted. I am sure if I worked there full
time as a judge, prosecutor, or registrar, I would soon come to feel the same way. Perhaps
the establishment of a "Defense Counsel Bar" might help to redress the institutional
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imbalance, and indeed at the time I was defending Dr. Kovacevic I talked with a number
of defense counsel about this possibility. The idea may someday get off the ground. The
crunch, as I see it, is if a Defense Counsel Bar lobbies for better offices and facilities in
the ICTY building, the Registrar will perceive this as a budgetary threat to the Registrar's
own plans for expansion and improvement of its services. The number of people
employed by the Registrar has skyrocketed from a handful at first to over 300 employees
at the present time. Hence, there is a possibility that the Registrar may find it
institutionally upsetting to allocate any budgetary assistance to an association of defense
counsel.
I believe it is important for lawyers who may be thinking of serving as defense
counsel at the ICTY or other international criminal tribunals to know of some [pg467]
examples of the obstacles that can be placed in their path by the Office of the Registrar.
At the outset of my representation of Dr. Kovacevic, I announced to the Registrar my
intention to bring in co-counsel. I was flatly informed that the Registrar has discretion to
approve or disapprove such a request. I did not contest the Registrar's power to pay or
refuse to pay fees to my co-counsel. But the Registrar informed me that even if I paid for
co-counsel out of my own pocket, they still had to approve the selection. I was told that
this is what the rules require, and if anything is a conversation-killer in dealing with the
Registrar it is when they invoke "the rules." (These rules can defy all reason, such as the
rule that requires all counsel to provide a photocopy of their actual law school diploma in
order to practice in the Court.) When they do so, they do not genuflect and lift their eyes
slowly toward the ceiling. But they convey that picture anyway.
If the Registrar makes it tough to get co-counsel, what follows is a compounding
of troubles. I had invited some Northwestern Law students to come over for a few weeks
in the summer to help me prepare the Kovacevic case for trial. I assigned one to become
familiar with the topics of the voluminous documents already filed in the case and to be
prepared to locate them when needed from a huge stack of three-ring binders. We had the
binders spread out in the courtroom on several of the tables and chairs that were set aside
for the defense attorneys. During the morning proceedings, this student was allowed to be
inside the courtroom. But when the court recessed for lunch, the guards told her to leave.
We had planned to use the lunch break together to prepare for the afternoon's arguments.
Indeed, the Registrar personnel, the translators, and all the prosecutors and their assistants
regularly used the courtroom during the lunch break. I was allowed to use it, but my
assistant was not. The reason: "Security." This word is even holier than "the rules." I told
the guard that my assistant would stay there with me because we were working on the
case, and it would be impossible to move all the documents and ring binders to the small
table in the defense counsel office without thoroughly rearranging them and setting us
back considerably in our work. The guard argued with me, and I told him that unless he
arrested me, my assistant and I were not moving.
The guard left to call in reinforcements. Meanwhile another guard who had
observed the situation told me that the sergeant in charge is new on the job, and that the
sergeant who was usually there would have understood my need for workspace.
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The Deputy Registrar then showed up with a contingent of guards who threatened
my student, and she decided that it was wise to leave the courtroom. Respectfully and
patiently, I explained to the Deputy Registrar that it was unfair to allow the prosecutors'
assistants to use the courtroom during lunch break but not the assistants for the defense
counsel. "The rules," he said, "do not provide for people who are not admitted to practice
before this tribunal to be in the courtroom during the lunch break." Why? I asked.
"Security," he said (and there was a virtual thunderbolt outside the building).
[pg468]
"Well," I protested, "you can look again inside her briefcase to see if there are any
Molotov cocktails." (We both knew that my student, as well as every person in the
building, had previously been searched carefully by the guards at the entrance gate.)
That's not the point, he replied; the point is that a rule is a rule. True, a different head
security officer might have interpreted it differently, but this one did not, and he was not
necessarily wrong. I asked the Deputy Registrar what he was going to do about it. "As a
favor to you," he said, "I won't do anything. Normally I'd write this incident up as a
breach of your obligations to the tribunal, and you would receive a letter of reprimand
from the court."
The foregoing account of the Registrar's mind-set is reflected to an extent in the
rule-bindedness of the judges themselves. In the early days of the ICTY, various
procedural rules were drafted by a committee of international experts. Naturally, though
they thought they had done a brilliant job, in fact they failed to anticipate many of the
problems that would come up. Unintended consequences then arose, but "a rule is a rule."
Only the judges could ever permit a departure from the rules, and then, only after counsel
had filed a motion, supporting briefs, asked for oral argument on the point, and made a
convincing showing that an absurd rule was in fact absurd.
One example may illuminate the hassle—but also the ultimate fairness of the
judicial proceedings. At the pretrial stage in my case, the prosecutor wanted to amend the
indictment to include more counts against my client. The rules of the tribunal provided
that, with respect to all indictments, the prosecutor submits the indictment to a reviewing
judge who passes on their sufficiency and approves or disapproves them. The framers of
the rules had in mind the initial indictment process, prior to the arrest of any person. But
since the rule on its face applied to all indictments, the prosecutor figured that he could
add new indictments to the Complaint in an ex parte proceeding before the reviewing
judge. Without notice to me, he approached the reviewing judge (the judge who had
initially approved the genocide indictment against Kovacevic and Drljaca), and she
simply approved the added counts. At this point, Dr. Kovacevic was already in custody
and I was already defending him. Yet the prosecutor resorted to this ex parte procedure
because the rule seemed to authorize it. As soon as I received a copy of the Amended
Indictment (listing a great many more counts against my client), I filed a motion in
protest. A hearing was held before our pretrial panel (three judges). I argued as
vigorously as I could that an ex parte procedure, once a person has been arrested and is
represented by counsel, is fundamentally unfair. The prosecutor was seeking to change
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the entire nature of the case against my client without allowing me to object to the
evidentiary sufficiency of the added indictments. The prejudice to my client, and to the
reputation for fairness of the tribunal, was compromised by such a procedure, even if the
rules of the tribunal appeared to allow for it. I argued that any rule that frustrates
fundamental fairness should not be allowed to stand.
The tribunal took the motion under consideration. I went back to Chicago (where
fortunately I had a semester's leave for research) and continued to work on the [pg469]
merits of the case from my office. Two months later, on my next trip to The Hague, I
heard informally that the judges had met in plenary session and made several
amendments to the rules of procedure. I went to the Registrar's office and obtained a copy
of the changes. I discovered that the judges had amended the indictment rule so that once
an accused person is in custody, an indictment cannot be amended on an ex parte basis.
The rule was also made retroactive. So I discovered, in this totally informal way, that I
had won my motion. But the panel never issued a decision on my motion. Indeed, the
motion was now moot because the rule had been changed. Future counsel, faced with an
amendment to the complaint against their clients, would simply assume that the rules
always provided for representation by counsel if the prosecutor sought an amendment to
the indictment. Although I was glad to have won even a silent victory, future counsel
may be inhibited from challenging the rules of procedure assuming that such motions are
never granted (the court simply changes the rule in closed session). Therefore it is
important for defense counsel to know that rules can be challenged and that judges can be
persuaded that a given rule is unfair. Unfortunately, because the tribunal hides in secrecy
their reasons for changing a rule, the rules may appear over time to acquire an
imperviousness that renders them virtually unchallengeable. This false history may
operate as a deterrent to any defense attorney who might otherwise wish to challenge a
rule. Perhaps these European tribunals are influenced by canon law, which traditionally is
changed in secret meetings of the church hierarchy who then tell the world that the canon
law has never been altered.
For counsel trained in the common law tradition, civil law courts such as the
ICTY may seem to be unfair venues to defend clients accused of a crime. There is no
doubt that the job is difficult. Yet the recent international criminal law tribunals have
taken on a grave and historic responsibility for making hitherto immune state officials
responsible for their criminal conduct. I left the ICTY with the same total commitment to
its goals as when I first took on the Kovacevic case. Perhaps the foregoing comments
may aid in improving the fairness and efficacy of the tribunal.

FOOTNOTES
*Leighton Professor of Law, Northwestern University. This essay is dedicated to
Professor M. Cherif Bassiouni, who more than any other person was responsible for the
coming-into-being of the international criminal tribunals for Yugoslavia and Rwanda. I
met Cherif in 1967 at the Wingspread Conference, the first conference of scholars
assembled to work out a plan for a future international criminal court. We both worked
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on the subcommittee to define "aggression," a subject that still lacks a good definition
even though the court of our visions in 1967—now the International Criminal Court—is
rapidly being ratified and should soon begin its work.
**Numbers in the format “pg459”, etc. refer to the pagination in the original article.
FN1 The indictment was read in English and Serbian, and it was a lengthy document.
FN2 I stated these allegations in full in open court at a pretrial stage in the case of Dr.
Kovacevic. The prosecutor made no comment nor objection, and the judges asked me no
question about my account of what had happened.
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